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he ombudsman has gradually emerged in the U.S. as a key 
tool among the various legal doctrines, institutions, and 
technologies used to reveal the government to the public. 
After the ombudsman’s initial development and implementation in 
northern Europe, several prominent administrative law scholars 
brought the institution to American policymakers and academics’ 
attention in the 1960s and 1970s during the initial wave of elite 
liberal disaffection with the regulatory state. Proponents during this 
initial period viewed the ombudsman as an independent entity 
within the administrative state that could, at least in theory, close 
the increasing distance between the bureaucracy and public. In its 
adaptation to the specific administrative task of open government 
law compliance and reform, the ombudsman has offered an 
institutional fix to the revealed deficiencies from which the legal 
rights approach to “freedom of information” suffers: the 
bureaucratic tendency to avoid complying with openness 
obligations and the expense and delays attendant to judicial review.  
This paper describes the ombudsman’s role in supporting the open 
government mandates of U.S. state and the U.S. federal 
governments, and fits it into a framework for understanding 
transparency that I have developed in earlier articles. I characterize 
the ombudsman as an institutional transparency fix, one that 
follows other such fixes—including most prominently the creation 
of legal rights to government information—in attempting to 
address the bureaucratic tendency to hoard information. Each fix, 
including the ombudsman, proceeds from prevailing assumptions 
about the best means to reveal the state, both reflecting and 
furthering historically-situated conceptions of government and its 
reform. Like the other fixes of the past fifty years, the ombudsman 
has made marginal gains in reforming open government laws and 
bureaucratic compliance with them. But it has not and it cannot 
make the state fully transparent or sufficiently transparent for open 
government advocates, for reasons I will discuss. 
§ 1 – THE TRANSPARENCY FIX 
Political theories of the democratic, classical liberal, and utilitarian 
sort agree that a modern democratic state must be visible to the 
public. Depending upon one’s preferred theory, the political norm 
of an open government enables the state to express or represent 
the beliefs and preferences of the public that it serves; and no 
matter one’s political preference regarding the state’s proper role 
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and size, the administrative norm of transparency enables a more 
accountable state that is capable of efficiently and effectively 
serving the public and performing its functions.1 If, as I have 
argued in previous work, we view transparency as understanding 
the state in predominantly cybernetic terms—by claiming to solve 
the problem of governance through the free flow of information 
from the state to the public—then transparency constitutes a 
crucial means to engineer the state into properly serving its political 
and administrative functions.2  
But the effort to impose transparency on the state must overcome 
bureaucracies’ tendency to hoard information. The state holds the 
information that it produces and receives, and, as Max Weber 
described, it often works zealously to protect its asymmetrical 
advantage over its institutional and political competition (e.g., in 
interbranch disputes and against its opposition) as well as the 
public.3 For nearly seven decades, transparency proponents in the 
U.S. have offered a series of fixes to this problem: most 
prominently, in the legal rights and administrative obligations that 
FOI and related laws have created; through civil society 
organizations like Transparency International that monitor, name, 
and shame corrupt states; by deploying information technologies 
that make government data widely available and usable through 
open source platforms; and through vigilante leaking of massive 
caches of government documents, as perpetrated most famously 
by WikiLeaks and Edward Snowden.4 Each of these fixes has in 
turn claimed to transform the state by forcing it to open itself to 
public view. They have all no doubt succeeded to some extent, and 
the state is more accessible today as a result of these efforts. But 
their successes have been marginal. Most public polls have found 
that the public trusts the state less despite the presence of these 
new laws, institutions, and technologies, and transparency 
proponents and the public experience open government as a goal 
that either recedes from view or continually comes closer but never 
fully arrives.5 To again frame the issue cybernetically, the state 
                                                
1 See generally Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885 
(2006). 
2 See generally Mark Fenster, Transparency in Search of a Theory, 18 EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF SOCIAL THEORY ___ (forthcoming 2015). 
3 See 2 MAX WEBER, 2 ECONOMY & SOCIETY 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus 
Wittich eds., 1968) (“Bureaucratic administration always tends to exclude the 
public, to hide its knowledge and action from criticism as well as it can.”). A full 
rendering of the literature that reiterates this point in a critical voice, arguing 
against its Weberian inevitably and in favor of reform, could fill a book. Two 
recent versions by American academics are JASON ROSS ARNOLD, SECRECY IN 
THE SUNSHINE ERA: THE PROMISE AND FAILURES OF U.S. OPEN 
GOVERNMENT LAWS (2014) and HEIDI KITROSSER, RECLAIMING 
ACCOUNTABILITY: TRANSPARENCY, EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION (2015).  
4 Mark Fenster, The Transparency Fix: Advocating Legal Rights and Their Alternatives 
in the Pursuit of a Visible State, 73 U. PITT. L. REV. 443 (2012). 
5 This is in some ways an intuitive claim, as Gallup polling in the U.S. over the 
past four decades has shown a steady decline in public trust in the federal 
government, even after the key amendments to the U.S. Freedom of 
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regularly appears to control the flow of information excessively, 
preventing the communication necessary to democratic order and 
proper administrative function. Hence, the need to “fix” the state 
by making it transparent 
§ 2 – The Ombudsman as Institutional Administrative Reform. 
Since its initial enactment in 1966, the federal FOIA has been the 
source of frustration, especially for open government activists. 
Congress has regularly amended the statute. As of this writing, the 
most significant recent amendments, made in 2007 in the OPEN 
Government Act, established the federal Office of Government 
Information Services, the first federal ombudsman devoted to 
administering FOIA. But American states have a long history of 
innovations using ombudsmen and ombuds-like institutions to 
provide an institutional check on compliance with their open 
government laws. Hawaii created the first state ombudsman four 
decades before OGIS’s founding, and many states have widely 
used either general ombuds offices or open-government-specific 
ombuds offices to oversee government compliance with 
informational laws. The state experience and the OGIS’s early 
years reveal the ombudsmen’s promises, advantages, and 
shortcomings.  
The practice of appointing officers to field and respond to 
complaints from their constituents dates to ancient civilizations 
and was part of medieval societies.6 The first official ombudsman 
appeared in eighteenth century Sweden, when King Charles XII of 
Sweden created the “Chancellor of Justice” position to help 
maintain control over his kingdom’s administration, and the 
position was enshrined in the Swedish Constitution early in the 
following century.7 The institution spread throughout Scandinavia 
during the first half of the twentieth century, with Finland adopting 
it in its constitution in 1991 and Denmark and Norway creating the 
office after World War II.8 The Federal Republic of Germany 
established the first such office outside of Scandinavia in 1957 with 
its military ombudsman, and the first country of the British 
                                                
Information Act in 1974. See Gallup, Trust in Government, available at 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/5392/trust-government.aspx (tracking trust in 
government from 1972 through 2014 and revealing steady decline of those 
stating they trust the executive and legislative branches of government either a 
“great deal” or a “fair amount”). But academics have also found through 
experimental research that transparency has no correlation to trust-building—
which is historically and culturally contingent—and may even have a negative 
correlation. See Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen et al., The Effect of Transparency on Trust 
in Government: A Cross-National Comparative Experiment, 73 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 575 
(2013). 
6 Stanley V. Anderson, Ombudsman Papers: American Experience and Proposals 
2 (U.C. Berkeley, 1969); Charles L. Howard, The Organizational Ombudsmen: 
Origins, Roles, and Operations: A Legal Guide 2-3 (2010). 2-3; Shirley A. Wiegand, A 
Just and Lasting Peace: Supplanting Mediation with the Ombuds Model, 12 Ohio St. J. on 
Disp. Resol. 95, 97 (1996). 
7 Howard, supra note, at 2-3; Donald C. Rowat, The Ombudsman Plan: The 
Worldwide Spread of an Idea 3-4 (2nd ed. 1985). 
8 Linda C. Reif, The Ombudsman, Good Governance and the International Human Rights 
System 6-7 (2004). 
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Commonwealth system to adopt one was New Zealand, which 
created a national ombudsman in 1962.9  
Administrative law professors and progressive good-government 
public administration scholars in the U.S. developed a sincere crush 
on the ombudsman concept in the early 1960s, in part in response 
to its success in northern Europe. Among legal academics, Walter 
Gellhorn and Kenneth Culp Davis, two towering figures in the 
post-World War II development of administrative law as an 
academic field in the U.S., were among its leading cheerleaders.10 
Gellhorn wrote two books extolling the ombudsman’s virtues. In 
Ombudsmen and Others (1966), he surveyed the ombuds and ombuds-
like institutions in nine different nations (from Denmark to Japan 
to the Soviet Union), and then in When Americans Complain (1966), 
his Holmes Lectures at Harvard, he proposed importing the form 
into the U.S. as a best means to provide the public with a channel 
for their grievances and to allow a non-political, external check on 
administrative actions without the costs, delays, and impediments 
of judicial review.11 Ombudsman offices would serve as impartial 
and non-political for constituents, as well as legitimate and 
sympathetic critics of civil servants whose advice would prove 
influential to those outside and inside government.12 This potential 
offered not just a second-best alternative to self-correcting 
bureaucracy—as Gellhorn asked, after extolling its virtues, “what 
have we to lose?”—but also a neat institutional fix to the 
bureaucratic and legal inadequacies of the administrative state. 
Donald Rowat, a Canadian public administration scholar, 
characterized the fervor that followed Gellhorn’s championing as 
an “ombudsmania” that spread the idea outside the academy and 
into the public consciousness.13  
In a focused reflection on Gellhorn’s role as ombudsman promoter 
published a decade after publication of Ombudsmen and Others and 
When Americans Complain, the American administrative law 
professor Paul Verkuil described the ombudsman as a large-scale 
institutional alternative to the adversarial system.14 Writing against 
the backdrop of the expansion of social service entitlements, the 
rise of Charles Reich’s theory of “new property,” and the Supreme 
Court’s due process revolution in Goldberg v. Kelly and that 
decision’s immediate aftermath, Verkuil viewed the stakes for 
developing the ombudsman as quite high. It was the means by 
which an immense bureaucratic system could deliver mass justice 
more efficiently and fairly than the traditional Anglo-American 
                                                
9 HOWARD, supra note, at 4-5. 
10 Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 845, 845-46 & n.7 (1975). 
11 Walter Gellhorn, Ombudsmen and Others: Citizens’ Protectors in Nine Countries 
(1966); Walter Gellhorn, When Americans Complain: Governmental Grievance 
Procedures (1966) [hereinafter Gellhorn, When Americans Complain]. 
12 Gellhorn, When Americans Complain, supra note, at 224-31. 
13 Donald Rowat, Introduction, in THE OMBUDSMAN: CITIZEN’S DEFENDER, at 
xii (Donald Rowat ed. 1968). 
14 Paul R. Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 845 (1975). 
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adversarial system. With the right institutional framework in place, 
a hybrid of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems could emerge 
in a truly modern welfare state.15 Verkuil wrote: 
The fear of government oppression, raised by the use of 
management and quality control techniques to the exclusion or 
minimization of adversary decision-making, can be neutralized if 
the people’s watchdog were to become a viable concept. In this 
way, the ombudsman signals the start of a new tradition; expedited 
public decision-making under the supervision of institutionalized 
external overseers of the system.16 
Coming after Gellhorn and reflecting on his initial attraction to the 
obmudsman, Verkuil thus framed the ombudsman as a universal, 
systemic, and independent solution capable of playing a key role in 
a system subject to unfairness and inefficiency. 
The ombudsman has not, however, become a central fixture in 
American administration, and its current proponents perceive the 
ombudsman’s virtues more narrowly than their predecessors. 
Despite their best efforts, American ombudsman advocates failed 
to establish a centralized ombudsman for the federal government 
in 1967 and throughout the 1970s,17 and although adoption in the 
U.S. has been relatively wide in public and private entities, the types 
of ombudsman and the range of their authority and role has been 
quite varied.18 While Congress and agencies have since established 
a broad array of specialized ombudsman and similar offices within 
the executive branch, generally within existing agencies,19 state and 
local governments took the lead in creating ombudsmen patterned 
on the Scandinavian model. Hawaii became the first state to 
establish an ombudsman when its office officially opened in 1969, 
two years after its creation by statute.20 At the same time, academic 
and professional views of the model have scaled back their view of 
it as an instrument with bureaucratic healing powers. The trend, as 
a recent book published by the American Bar Association’s Section 
of Dispute Resolution characterized it, has been to view the 
ombudsman as focused more on conflict resolution and mediation 
rather than widespread reform.21 This is a narrower view than the 
definitions and functions provided in the earlier generation of 
                                                
15 Verkuil, supra note , at 851-61. 
16 Id. at 856. 
17 Roger C. Cramton, A Federal Ombudsman, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1, 10-11; D. Leah 
Meltzer, The Federal Workplace Ombuds, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549 
(1998). 
18 Wiegand, supra note , at 102-112. 
19 For an overview of this trend, see Wendy R. Ginsberg and Frederick M. 
Kaiser, Federal Complaint-Handling, Ombudsman, and Advocacy Offices, 
Congressional Research Service Report RL34606 (Aug. 4, 2009), available at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34606.pdf. 
20 ANDERSON, supra note, at 34-37. U.S. newspapers began to adopt ombudsman 
during the same period. See James S. Ettema & Theodore L. Glasser, Public 
Accountability or Public Relations? Newspaper Ombudsmen Define Their Role, 
JOURNALISM Q., Spring 1997, at 3-12; Kate McKenna, “The Loneliest Job in the 
Newsroom,” AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1993, at 41.  
21 HOWARD, supra note, at 75.  
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scholarship, which emphasized structure—with independence and 
impartiality serving as the touchstones—and a limited authority to 
recommend and publicize.22 It is also quite different from the 
European ombudsman model, which expects a more 
interventionist institution headed by a widely-known figure who 
will independently challenge government decisions.23 
The history of its development reveals a strong and weak form of 
the ombudsman as concept and model. The strong form presents 
the ombudsman as an essential element of governance—an 
institutional solution within the state that can bridge the gulfs 
among separate branches of government by enabling independent 
oversight of the administration, thereby augmenting oversight on 
behalf of and in place of the legislature without the bother and 
expense of relying upon the judiciary. The weak form views the 
ombudsman role as a safety valve that can resolve the disputes 
which inevitably arise from the system’s functioning, providing 
individuals with a means to seek redress without the bother and 
expense of judicial review. Viewed this way, the ombudsman is less 
a part of the bureaucratic system and more of an adjunct to it. It 
can help ameliorate some of the system’s occasional malfunctions 
through more informal mediation practices.24 
                                                
22 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note , at 3 (listing ombudsman’s key structure and 
functions as being “(1) independent, (2) impartial, (3) expert in government, (4) 
universally accessible, and (5) empowered only to recommend and publicize”); 
Rowat, supra note , xxiv (emphasizing independence and non-partisan status, the 
“power to investigate, criticize and publicize, but not to reverse, administration 
action,” and serving to supervise the administration and deal with “specific 
complaints from the public against administrative injustice and 
maladministration”). These views seem more aligned with what Shirley Wiegand 
called the “classical ombudsman” model, as opposed to the “quasi-ombuds” 
model that has spread throughout the U.S. and is less independent. Wiegand, 
supra note, at 112. 
23 On the history of the European Ombudsman (“EO”) and its role in 
addressing the refusal to disclose information as a form of “maladministration”, 
see DAMIAN CHALMERS & ADAM TOMKINS, EUROPEAN UNION PUBLIC LAW 
337-46 (2007); CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
43-44 (2002); Ian Harden, The European Ombudsman’s Efforts to Increase Openness in 
the Union, in INCREASE TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION? 123 (Veerle 
Deckmyn ed., 2002). On the EO, its relationship to other ombudsman offices 
in Europe, and the network of accountability it provides, see generally Carol 
Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A 
Network Approach, 13 EUR. L.J. 542, 555-560 (2007). On the EO’s role as part of 
a network of internal institutions pushing for transparency within the European 
Parliament and EU Council of Ministers, see Maarten Zbigniew Hillebrandt, 
Deirdre Curtin & Albert Meijer, Transparency in the EU Council of Ministers: An 
Institutional Analysis, 20 EUR. L.J. 1, 15-19 (2007). 
24 This distinction is akin to what Charles Howard characterizes between the 
classic ombudsman with formal prosecutorial and investigative powers and the 
“organizational ombudsman” who instead serves as “a distinct, informal, 
meditative, and confidential channel.” HOWARD, supra note, at 23-24. 
 The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by Institutional Design – 
Mark Fenster. 
 
– 281 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
§ 3 – THE OMBUDSMAN AS TRANSPARENCY FIX: STATES AS 
LABORATORIES 
Viewed in this larger context, when subnational units in the U.S. 
attempt to use the ombudsman model to assist in the 
administration and enforcement of their open government laws, 
they have sought to engineer an institutional fix to non-compliant, 
secretive bureaucracies. In theory, the ombudsman should serve 
simultaneously as a valve operating within the state’s machinery 
that can help release information and as an independent monitor 
capable of providing objective counsel to legislatures and 
bureaucracy. It can help improve the flow of information and the 
larger system in which the state keeps information and makes it 
available.  
States adopted the ombudsman model long before the federal 
government did. Although they vary considerably in their approach 
to their institutional innovations, states’ creations include or 
exclude a series of discrete options:  
– Institutional independence: in which branch are they located and 
are they freestanding or part of another entity? 
– Institutional structure: are they a multi-member commission or 
headed by one individual? 
– What procedures are they to use in settling disputes between 
government entities and requesters? Dispute settlement? 
Administrative appeal? Inquisitorial investigation? 
– Formal authority: Are they delegated investigatory authority? Do 
they have subpoena power? What kind of enforcement power do 
they have? Can they impose penalties? 
– Are they required to report to the legislature regarding their work 
and proposed legal reforms? 
The choices that states have made when establishing a formal 
ombudsman office or its informal equivalent reflect, among other 
things, local legal and institutional history, the political conditions 
at the time of the institutions’ creation, and the role of non-
governmental organizations in their founding. The resulting 
institutions’ effectiveness in assisting requesters and legislatures is 
similarly contingent on numerous factors, including especially the 
success of their initial leadership at institution-building and gaining 
the trust of agencies and repeat requesters. And their role in making 
the public more informed—the ultimate purpose of the open 
government laws the ombuds administer—is impossible to gauge. 
It is therefore difficult to derive specific theories or even working 
hypotheses as to whether and how well ombudsmen work, besides 
some general, rather banal best practices. They are clearly better 
than nothing in most instances, especially for those requesters they 
assist, but how much of an improvement that they make is the 
subject of active debate within the states themselves. Even deriving 
a typology the help categorize them in order to judge their 
effectiveness is difficult, as the leading academic chronicler of the 
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form has shown.25 To illustrate the variance, consider my effort at 
typology. 
A) Traditional ombudsmen (general jurisdiction and 
focused on open government) 
Some states have created a formal, identifiable institution 
specifically intended to achieve the classic public ombudsman goal 
of assisting the public in its dealings with government, and have 
included the administration of open government laws either within 
a general portfolio or in a standalone ombudsman with a narrow 
focus.  
Hawaii created the first state-wide ombudsman by statute in 1967 
and two decades later created a new ombuds institution devoted 
specifically to its open records act (which it later expanded to take 
jurisdiction over open meeting law disputes). Established initially 
as a “temporary office,” the Office of Information Practice (OIP) 
operates from within the office of the lieutenant governor, with a 
director appointed by the governor. 26 Its primary duty is to resolve 
complaints filed by a requestor, in aid of which it may provide 
advice or conduct an investigation and examine requested records 
itself (for which it can seek court enforcement against a reluctant 
agency) and recommend discipline against government officers.27 
It should also assist agencies in understanding and complying with 
their legal obligations and recommend statutory reforms to the 
legislature.28 Requesters need not use the OIP before proceeding 
with litigation and retain the right to file suit after the OIP 
completes its review, and an agency has the right to seek judicial 
review of an adverse decision by the OIP.29 The Hawaii legislature 
recently amended the records act and open meetings law in 2012 
to establish a quite deferential standard of review for OIP decisions 
                                                
25 See Daxton R. “Chip” Stewart, Managing Conflict Over Access: A Typology of 
Sunshine Law Dispute Resolution Systems, 1 J. MED. L. & ETH. 49, 60-79 (2009), 
which posits an overlapping and not particularly cogent series of models that 
include “Multiple Process,” “Administrative Facilitation” (which can include a 
“Mediation Path” or an “Ombuds Path,” or simply be “Other”), 
“Administrative Adjudication” (itself included in some of those he groups within 
“Multiple Process”), “Advisory,” and “Litigation”—which is to say, those 
jurisdictions that have no discernible alternative path to dispute settlement. The 
effort is worthy but the results suggest that it may not have been worthwhile, 
because the states’ varied innovations resist anything but the roughest 
categorization. My typology is more akin to that provided in Henry Hammitt, 
Mediation without Litigation (Nat’l Freedom of Info. Coalition, FOI Reports Vol. 
2 No. 3, n.d.), available at; 
http://www.nfoic.org/sites/default/files/hammitt_mediation_without_litigati
on.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
26 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-41(a) (2014). The statute states that the OIP is 
temporary and for a special purpose. However, the OIP has continued to exist 
since its creation in  
27 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-42(1)-(6) (2014). 
28 HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-42(7), (9) & (10) (2014). 
29 HAW REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 92F-15, 92F-15.5, 92F-43 (2014). 
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in favor of requestors.30 In fiscal year 2014, OIP received over 
$500,000 in appropriations for operations, and the number of both 
informal and formal requests it receives for assistance from the 
public has steadily risen over the past four years.31 
Other states incorporate open government issues within a 
traditional ombudsman that handles all manner of citizen 
complaints about the state agencies. Like Hawaii, Alaska has a 
traditional ombudsman office that was established in 1975; unlike 
Hawaii, however, Alaska’s ombudsman investigates complaints 
about agency actions under the open government as the state has 
no separate office focused on open government.32 Arizona calls its 
ombudsman a “citizen’s aide,” but its appointments process33 and 
authorities are similar to Alaska’s and Hawaii’s.34 The Arizona 
legislature has granted the citizen’s aide specific authority to train 
the public and agencies regarding open government laws.35 Iowa’s 
citizens’ aide, appointed by the legislature,36 also has investigatory 
authority and enjoys the power to issue subpoenas and seek their 
enforcement. It can seek a civil penalty against a person who 
willfully hinders its investigation.37  
Pennsylvania’s Office of Open Records (OOR), housed within the 
Department of Community and Economic Development and 
                                                
30 HAW REV. STAT. ANN. § 92F-15 (2014) (setting the standard of judicial review 
of agency opinions as “palpably erroneous” except where the OIP upholds the 
agency’s denial of access, in which case the standard of review is de novo).  
31 State of Hawaii Office of Information Practices, 2014 Annual Report, 6-8, 
available at http://oip.hawaii.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ANNUAL-
REPORT-2014-FINAL.pdf. 
32 ALASKA OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ALASKA’S OMBUDSMAN: 
http://ombud.alaska.gov/about-the-O.php (last visited Apr. 11, 2015).  
The Alaska ombudsman is appointed by a two-thirds vote of the legislature and 
must receive the approval of the Governor. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 24.55.020 
(West 2014). The legislature also has a limited removal power. Id. at § 24.55.050. 
The ombudsman can investigate administrative acts of agencies regardless of the 
finality of the act and has the authority to investigate on its own motion. Id at. § 
24.55.100, 120 (West 2014). To enforce its investigatory powers, the ombudsman 
has subpoena power over both testimony and records that the ombudsman believes 
to be reasonably related to its investigation, and can seek court enforcement of 
the subpoenas it issues. Id. at § 24.55.170. 
33 The citizens’ aide candidate, nominated by a committee comprised of 
legislators and the public, needs a two-thirds vote from both legislative houses. 
While the governor may veto an appointment, the legislature can successfully 
appoint the citizens’ aide candidate despite a gubernatorial veto with a three-
fourths vote. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1373 (West 2014). The legislature has 
limited removal powers. See Id. at § 41-1375. 
34 The citizen’s aide may issue subpoenas, but must seek assistance from other 
government entities to enforce them. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-1378(d)(5) 
41-1376(b) (West 2014). 
35 Id. at § 41-1376.01(a) (West 2014). 
36 IOWA CODE ANN. § 2C.3 (West 2014). The legislative council makes the 
appointment which is then confirmed by the vote of both legislative houses. 
37 IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 2C.9, 2C.9(5), 2C.22 (West 2014); Citizens’ Aide/Ombudsman 
v. Miller, 543 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Iowa 1996) (upholding Citizen’s Aide’s authority to 
issue subpoena in its role as “people’s watchdog”). 
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headed by an executive director appointed by the Governor,38 plays 
a dual role: overseeing a formal administrative appeal process for 
requesters prior to litigation39 and running an informal mediation 
program intended to resolve disputes prior to an agency’s issuance 
of a denial.40 Once an agency issues a denial, a requester cannot use 
the mediation program because of the strict timelines the statute 
establishes for administrative appeals and litigation.41 The number 
of administrative appeals OOR conducts vastly outnumber the 
mediations it oversees.42 Tennessee’s Open Records Counsel, 
housed within the Comptroller of the Treasury (who is elected by 
the state’s General Assembly), also informally mediates disputes 
but lacks any investigatory authority besides the power to issue 
informal advisory opinions.43 It must confer with a statutorily 
created advisory committee, composed of members from NGOs 
that represent government, press, and public interests, to review 
proposed legislative changes to the open records laws.44 
B) Multi-member commissions 
The quite powerful Connecticut Freedom of Information 
Commission exemplifies a quite different model of internal 
oversight than the traditional ombudsman office, one that far fewer 
states have adopted. Established in 1975 to enforce the state’s 
broad right of access, 45 Connecticut’s commission resides within 
the legislatively created Office of Governmental Accountability46 
and consists of nine voting members, five of whom are appointed 
by the governor (with the advice and consent of the General 
Assembly), including the Chairman, and four of whom are 
                                                
38 65 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1310 (West 2014). The executive director has 
the authority to appoint appeals officers and additional staff members. Id. 
39 65 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1101 (West 2014). 
40 65 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1310(a)(6) (West 2014); 
41 See 65 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 67.1101(a)(1) (West 2014); Pennsylvania Office 
of Open Records, Informal Mediation: 
http://openrecords.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/open_records/44
34/informal_mediation/488137 (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
42 In 2013, for example, OOR conducted 2478 appeals and only 4 mediations. 
See PENNSYLVANIA OFFICE OF OPEN RECORDS, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 6, 24 
(2014), available at 
https://www.dced.state.pa.us/public/oor/2013AnnualReport.pdf (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015). 
43 TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-4-601 (West 2014). 
44 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-4-602, 8-4-603 (West 2014). 
45 Dir., Dept. of Info. Tech. of Town of Greenwich v. Freedom of Info. 
Comm'n, 874 A.2d 785, 791 (Conn. 2005) (noting that the general rule of 
disclosure is well established); see e.g. Town of W. Hartford v. Freedom of Info. 
Comm'n, 588 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991). 
46 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-205; STATE OF CONNECTICUT, CONNECTICUT’S 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT: 
http://www.ct.gov/ctportal/cwp/view.asp?a=843&q=246450 (last visited Apr. 
11, 2015). 
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appointed by various members of the legislature.47 Upon receiving 
an appeal from a person denied the right to attend an agency’s 
meeting or to inspect public records,48 the Commission can hold a 
hearing, administer oaths, examine witness, receive evidence, issue 
subpoenas to compel attendance and require the production of any 
evidence relevant to the investigation and seek their judicial 
enforcement, and grant appropriate administrative relief as well as 
impose civil fines.49 To file suit against an agency, a requestor must 
first exhaust the Commission’s administrative remedies,50 and 
courts review the Commission’s decisions under a deferential 
“substantial evidence” test.51 The Commission may intervene or 
participate in the initial appeal and appeal any lower court ruling 
that overrules it.52 It also performs an educational function for state 
and local agencies and makes legislative recommendations 
regarding the administration of the open government laws.53 To 
summarize, then, Connecticut’s commission has remarkable 
investigatory powers and institutional independence, and is granted 
standing to challenge any lower court that overrules its decisions.  
New Jersey, Virginia, and Utah share Connecticut’s commission 
structure but do not endow their commissions with such 
authority.54 New Jersey’s five-member Government Records 
                                                
47 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-205(a) (West 2014). The Office of Governmental 
Accountability was established by the Connecticut legislature. CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 1-300 (West 2014). 
48 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-206(b)(1) (West 2014). 
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-205(d), 1-206(b)(2) (West 2014); see generally 
Ethics Comm'n of Town of Glastonbury v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 23 A.3d 
1211, 1215-17 (Conn. 2011) (recognizing Commission’s broad remedial power 
but holding that the Commission must tailor its remedy to the nature of the 
violation).  
50 Any party aggrieved by the Commission may appeal in accordance with 
section 4-183. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-206(d) (West 2014). The exhaustion 
of administrative remedies doctrine, codified by statute, gives “the Superior 
Court jurisdiction only over appeals from a final decision of an administrative 
agency.” Fromer v. Freedom of Info. Comm’n, CV030521936, 2004 WL 
1926010 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2004); Fairfield v. Connecticut Siting Council, 679 A.2d 
354, 369 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-183 (West 2014). 
51 Lucarelli v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 43 A.3d 237, 240 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2012) (defining “substantial evidence” review as based on whether the 
Commission’s decision “resulted from a correct application of the law to the 
facts found and could reasonably and logically follow from such facts”); Carpenter 
v. Freedom of Information Commission, 755 A.2d 364, 368 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000) 
(upholding Commission decision under substantial evidence test). 
52 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-242 (a) (West 2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 
1-242 (b) (West 2014). The Commission is granted standing to sue under CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-206(d) (West 2014). 
53 See Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-205(e), (f) (West 2014).; Paula Sobral Pearlman, 
Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, Final Report: Public Access 
and Accountability Legislation 2014 Regular Session, (2014), available at 
http://www.ct.gov/foi/cwp/view.asp?a=4314&Q=547006 (last visited Apr. 
11, 2015). 
54 New York, too, has a formal commission—the Committee on Open 
Government—but it only has the power to issue advisory opinions regarding 
New York’s Freedom of Information Law and to recommend legislative 
changes, and has no authority to investigate or mediate disputes. See N.Y. PUB. 
 The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by Institutional Design – 
Mark Fenster. 
 
– 286 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
Council (GRC)55 offers voluntary mediation at no cost to frustrated 
requesters,56 followed by an investigation if the mediation fails57—
although the GRC has no subpoena power and can only issue fines 
to public officials who knowingly and unreasonably deny access to 
public records.58 GRC’s decisions regarding a public record are 
subject to judicial review.59 Virginia’s Freedom of Information Act 
established the Virginia Freedom of Information Advisory 
Council, which exists within the state’s legislative branch and 
contains twelve members, including the Attorney General, the 
Librarian of Virginia, and the Director of the Division of 
Legislative Services, or their respective designees, and appointees 
from each legislative branch and the governor.60 Its purpose is “to 
help resolve disputes over Freedom of Information Act issues,”61 
and the Council attempts to resolve disputes between requesters 
and government agencies by conferring with requesters and issuing 
advisory opinions—opinions that it has no legal authority to 
impose, although agencies are required to “cooperate with, and 
provide such assistance to, the Council as the Council may 
request.”62 Utah’s seven-member State Records Committee 
performs only administrative appeals (without any authority to 
conduct or oversee mediation), but has broad authority, including 
the authority to issue and seek judicial enforcement of subpoenas, 
as part of its power to investigate.63 
C) Informal dispute resolution institutions 
Florida takes an opposite approach from Connecticut. In response 
to a rising number of disputes over the laws’ application and 
                                                
OFFICERS LAW § 89(1)(b) (McKinney 2012); N.Y. COMM. ON OPEN GOV’T, 
FAQ – FREEDOM OF INFO. LAW (FOIL) (2012): 
http://www.dos.ny.gov/coog/freedomfaq.html#requestresponse. 
Texas’s Open Records Steering Committee, which has representatives from 
various agencies as members and is overseen by the Attorney General, advises 
the Attorney General and Governor regarding the law and state agencies’ 
compliance with it. TEX. GOV. CODE ANN. §552.009(a), (b), (d) (Vernon 2012). 
It serves no dispute resolution function. 
55 The GRC exists within the Department of Community Affairs and consists 
of the Commissioner of Community Affairs (or his designee), the Commissioner 
of Education (or his designee) and three members of the public appointed by 
the Governor. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-7(a) (West 2014). 
56 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-7(b), (d), (e) (West 2014); see generally NEW JERSEY 
GOVERNMENT RECORDS COUNCIL, MEDIATION PROCESS (2012): 
http://nj.gov/grc/mediation/brochure. 
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-7(c) (West 2014). 
58 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-11 (West 2014). 
59 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-7(e) (West 2014). These decisions are appealable to 
the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court. Id. 
60 VA. CODE ANN. § 30-178(A), (B) (West 2014). 
61 VIRGINIA FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL, SERVICES OF 
THE COUNCIL (2012), available at: 
http://foiacouncil.dls.virginia.gov/Services/welcome.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 
2015). 
62 VA. CODE ANN. § 30-181 (West 2014). 
63 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63G-2-403(8), (10), (11), 63G-2-501 (West 2014).  
 The Informational Ombudsman: Fixing Open Government by Institutional Design – 
Mark Fenster. 
 
– 287 – 
International Journal of Open Government 
http://ojs.imodev.org/index.php?journal=RIGO 
increasing litigation costs, the Florida Legislature established a 
Voluntary Mediation Program within the Attorney General’s 
Office to help resolve disputes involving access to public 
records.64 Florida’s mediation program differs from the traditional 
ombudsman approach used in both the commission and single-
officer models. Disputes that have not reached litigation are eligible 
for the Mediation Program, so long as both parties agree to utilize 
it.65 The mediator lacks investigatory authority and subpoena 
power over testimony and records and can only provide the 
assistance that the mediating parties’ request.66 The results of the 
mediation do not bind the parties.67 It applies only to disputes over 
records and does not extend to open meetings. Relying on one or 
more mediators as employees rather than appointees—and 
therefore with no independence from the elected Attorney General 
or job protection68—the Program does nothing more than offer a 
neutral third person to encourage the resolution of a public records 
dispute by facilitating a mutually acceptable agreement.69 Although 
the Office of the Attorney General had the authority to adopt rules 
of procedure to govern the Mediation Program’s proceedings, it 
had never adopted any and did not object when the legislature 
removed its rule-making authority in 2012.70 A recent statewide 
Open Government Commission established to review Florida’s 
“Sunshine Laws” and to suggest reforms for their enforcement 
proposed moving the Mediation Program from the Attorney 
General’s office to a cabinet-level position in the Governor’s 
office. The Commission reasoned that this institutional 
independence would improve executive branch agency compliance 
with open records and meeting laws.71 The proposal has not been 
adopted. 
Indiana’s Public Access Counselor, appointed by the Governor 
without legislative confirmation,72 also lacks authority to resolve 
conflicts between requesters and public agencies. It enjoys the 
authority to investigate public agencies, which are required to 
cooperate with the counselor during a public records 
                                                
64 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.60 (West 2014). 
65 Areizaga v. Bd. of County Com'rs of Hillsborough County, 935 So. 2d 640, 643 (Fla. 
2d DCA 2006). 
66 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 16.60(3), (4) (2014). 
67 COMMISSION ON OPEN GOVERNMENT REFORM, REFORMING FLORIDA’S 
OPEN GOVERNMENT LAWS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 32 (2009), available at: 
http://floridafaf.org/files/2012/12/Commission-On-Open-Government.-
Final-Report-Open-Government-Reports.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
68 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.60 (West 2014). 
69 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.60(1) (West 2014). 
70 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.60(3)(a) (West 2014); Florida Staff Analysis, H.B. 7055, 
3/19/2012. 
71 Commission on Open Government Reform, supra note, at 33-34.  
72 The governor appoints the counselor and may remove the counselor for cause. 
IND. CODE § 5-14-4-6;7 (West 2014). While Indiana uses an appointment 
scheme, its scheme contrasts with the majority of schemes discussed supra 
because it calls on the governor, without any requirement of consent or 
confirmation from the legislature, to appoint the counselor.  
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investigation.73 But it lacks subpoena power over persons or 
records and its statutory authority does not allow it to initiate legal 
proceedings to enforce its powers. A recalcitrant agency therefore 
faces no consequences for its refusal to cooperate.74 Instead, the 
counselor’s main role when a requester seeks assistance is to issue 
an advisory opinion regarding the dispute and public access laws—
opinions that are not binding on courts or required for requesters 
as a precursor to filing suit.75 Nevertheless, Indiana courts have 
found the Counselor’s opinions to be informative when deciding 
open records issues,76 and requesters who file suit without seeking 
an advisory opinion from the counselor are generally not entitled 
to recover attorney’s fees, court costs, and other reasonable 
expenses.77 The Counselor is required to educate the public and 
agencies about the rights and obligations created by the state’s open 
government laws,78 is also responsible for making recommendations 
to the general assembly regarding the improvement of public records 
access.79 Maine’s Public Access Ombudsman also has little 
affirmative legal authority to meet its statutory charge to “[r]espond 
to and work to resolve complaints made by the public and public 
agencies and officials regarding the State’s freedom of access 
laws.”80 It can only issue non-binding advisory opinions, request 
“assistance” from agencies, engage in educational efforts, and issue 
an annual report documenting its activities and making 
recommendations to improve public access to meetings and 
documents.81 
D) Conclusion: Diverse Models, But Are They Effective? 
American states have adopted a general idea—that judicial review 
should not be the only external check on an agency’s compliance 
with open government laws—and taken innovative steps to 
establish distinct institutions within their own constitutional and 
bureaucratic systems to further it. At one extreme, Connecticut has 
created a powerful, multi-member commission, with wide-ranging 
and extensive authority; at the other, Florida has established a 
                                                
73 IND. CODE § 5-14-5-5 (West 2014). 
74 IND. CODE § 5-14-4-10 (West 2014). 
75 IND. CODE §§ 5-14-4-10(6), 5-14-5-9 (West 2014). 
76 See, e.g., Smith v. Maximum Control Facility, 850 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Ind. Ct. 
App. 2006) (noting, when ruling against agency in public records dispute, that 
requester had the support of the Public Access Counselor”). 
77 IND. CODE §§ 5-14-3-9(i), 5-14-5-4 (West 2014). While the Indiana public 
records statutes do not require an aggrieved requester to submit a complaint to 
the counselor, the statutes highly incentivize the use of the counselor’s complaint 
process. IND. CODE § (West 2014).  
78 IND. CODE § 5-14-4-10(1) (West 2014). It does so in great part by making its 
advisory opinions freely available on its website. INDIANA PUBLIC ACCESS 
COUNSELOR, http://www.in.gov/pac/index.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
79 IND. CODE § 5-14-4-10(7) (West 2014). 
80 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5 § 200-I(4) (West 2014) (stating that the 
Ombudsman’s recommendation regarding a dispute is not binding on agencies 
and officials and withholding authority to issue a subpoena or file suit). 
81 Id. 
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single-person entity under its Attorney General with little but the 
moral authority to assist in settling disputes. In the middle, most 
other states with ombudsmen or ombuds-like institutions have 
chosen among the various institutional structures and legal 
authorities in establishing their own independent offices.  
How can we evaluate the performance of these institutions? In the 
most extensive analysis (albeit only qualitative and impressionistic), 
Professor Daxton Stewart has noted that three ombudsman 
programs that he studied, those in Iowa, Virginia, Arizona, had 
“provided valuable services to citizens, government, and 
journalists.”82 His chronicle of each state’s adoption of a program, 
however, recounted the political conflicts that they worked within 
and engendered, and conceded their imperfections as agents of 
open government.83 Although his work largely praises the 
institution, he frequently heard from activists and participants that, 
for example, the new ombudsman “‘didn’t turn out to be the 
panacea we all thought’”84 or that it too often “split the baby” in a 
dispute, leaving the requester unsatisfied.85 There is no doubt that 
they are better than nothing; however, as Stewart notes in another 
article, they “have not proven to be a magic solution.”86 
Moreover, it is difficult to predict whether and how any particular 
ombudsman component or form will function. For example, 
Florida’s very small, informal mediation program—which one 
might assume would have little success, since it has no authority—
in fact is widely praised within the state. This is in part because its 
costs of operation and use are low—considerably lower than 
litigation for both government and requester, especially for 
requestors who have not yet retained an attorney—and in part 
because it proceeds by informal phone and electronic 
communication, saving the parties travel costs.87 Its success also 
clearly comes from the attorney who serves as the mediator, who 
has run the program for most of its existence and who has built up 
enormous legitimacy and good will among government attorneys 
and who can persuade recalcitrant agencies of their duty to disclose 
documents.88 The extent of its influence is unclear, however. 
Between 1995 and 2000, the Mediation Program handled over 400 
                                                
82 Daxton R. Stewart, Evaluating Public Access Ombuds Programs: An Analysis 
of Experiences in Virginia, Iowa and Arizona in Creating and Implementing 
Ombuds Offices to Handle Disputes Arising Under Open Government Laws, 
2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 437, 496. 
83 See, e.g., id. at (quoting id. at 458-60 (noting the Iowa Citizens’ Aide has been 
perceived by some agencies as partial to journalists, and compliance with the 
state’s open government laws “remains problematic”); id. at 477-478, 483-484 
(quoting activists as complaining that Arizona’s Ombudsman-Citizens’ Aide was 
not a solution to dealing with recalcitrant, non-compliant agencies, and that it is 
not serving as a useful alternative to litigation). 
84 Id. at 449 (regarding the Iowa ombudsman) 
85 Id. at 477 (regarding the Arizona ombudsman). 
86 Daxton R. Stewart. Systems in the Shadow of Sunshine Laws, RUTGERS CONF. 
RESOL. J., Spring 2012, at 21. 
87 Email from Pat Gleason, Special Counsel for Open Government for Attorney 
General Pam Bondi, to Adolph Posey (Nov. 13, 2012, 22:30 EST). 
88 See Stewart, Shadow of Sunshine Laws, supra note, at 15-16. 
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disputes, successfully settling 325 of them.89 The Attorney General 
stopped publishing official statistics on the mediation program in 
2000, when the legislature repealed the subsection that required the 
Attorney General to provide an annual report.90 According to a 
count kept by its chief mediator, the number of cases remained 
relatively steady throughout the decade and after showing an initial 
promise of evolving into a pervasive alternative to litigation, the 
number of disputes mediated through the Mediation Program has 
remained stagnant.91 It is difficult to measure the actual success of 
an apparently successful program. 
§ 2 – THE FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN 
Similarly seeking to fix agencies’ imperfect compliance with its 
open government mandates, the U.S. Congress in 2009 established 
the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) within the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). 
Congress’ purpose was for OGIS to oversee agency compliance 
with FOIA and to offer mediation services to resolve disputes 
between persons making requests and administrative agencies “as 
a non-exclusive alternative to litigation.”92 As the OGIS homepage 
explains, “Congress refers to OGIS as ‘the Federal FOIA 
ombudsman.’ What does this mean? In short, OGIS serves as a 
bridge between requesters and agencies, particularly in situations 
where clear, direct communication has been lacking.”93 The Office 
also makes official recommendations for policy changes to 
Congress and the President, works collaboratively with the Office 
of Information Policy in the Department of Justice to implement 
these changes, suggests best practices for FOIA compliance and 
information sharing to federal agencies, and assists requesters both 
                                                
89 The case statistics were taken from the Open Government Mediation Program 
2000 Annual Report. OPEN GOVERNMENT MEDIATION PROGRAM, ANNUAL 
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (March 2000). 
90 2000 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2000-158 (H.B. 1063). The Florida legislature 
found the annual report subsection obsolete and no longer needed by the 
Attorney General. Florida Staff Analysis, H.B. 4021, 2/8/2000. The annual 
report had been established in FLA. STAT. ANN. § 16.60(5) (2000). 
91 In 2003, 149 cases were handled by the program, and from July 2008 through 
June 2009, the total number of cases dropped to fifty-four. From July 2009 to 
December 2010, the case load remained stable with seventy-six of the eighty-
seven mediated cases being resolved. Email from Pat Gleason, Special Counsel 
for Open Government for Attorney General Pam Bondi, to Adolph Posey 
(Nov. 13, 2012, 22:30 EST). 
92 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(3) (2014); see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(2) (2014) (requiring OGIS 
to review agency policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA, and to 
recommend policy changes). The Archivist of the National Archives appoints 
the OGIS director. See National Archives and Records Administration, National 
Archives Appoints Miriam Nisbet as Director of the Office of Government Information 
Services (June 10, 2009): 
http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2009/nr09-93.html (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2015). 
93 Office of Government Information Services, About OGIS: 
https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
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in drafting FOIA requests and working with agencies to procure 
the information they seek.94 
Requesters initiate OGIS’s dispute resolution process by 
submitting a written request for assistance from OGIS that 
includes identifying information about its original FOIA request, 
authorization for OGIS’s participation, and a description of the 
kind of assistance the requester seeks.95 OGIS pledges to “work 
cooperatively” with agencies’ existing administrative process that 
process, encouraging the requester to exhaust his or her remedies 
within the agency but recognizing that the requester might 
justifiably request OGIS’s earlier intervention if the agency fails to 
reply to the request in a timely manner.96 OGIS also works with 
requesters to help narrow their requests, explain agency procedures 
and legal issues to them, and obtain information from the agency 
about the stage of their review and issues relating to information 
an agency has concluded is exempt from disclosure under FOIA.97 
OGIS’s role, then, is to help the disputants to “facilitate 
communication and try to reach amicable resolutions” by, among 
other things, “attempting to make contact with FOIA specialists 
and other appropriate agency staff, working through the appeal 
process, and/or working with FOIA Public Liaisons to resolve 
disputes.”98 If these informal efforts to facilitate a resolution fail to 
reach a satisfactory conclusion, OGIS offers to arrange or conduct 
formal mediation.99 
Congress appears to like OGIS and has sought to address the 
limitations it has faced, first in the proposed but unenacted FOIA 
Improvement Act of 2014 and more recently in a bill that is moving 
through Congress at the time of this writing (April 2015).100 The 
                                                
94 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(h)(2) (2014); Office of Government Information Services, 
OGIS Procedures, https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/ogis-procedures.htm 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2015) Office of Government Information Services, 
Improving FOIA, https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/Improving-FOIA.htm 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
95 See Office of Government Information Services, How does a customer make a 
request for OGIS assistance?: 
https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/ogis-
procedures.htm#Request+OGIS+assistance (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
96 Office of Government Information Services, When does OGIS get involved in 
FOIA disputes?: 
https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/ogis-procedures.htm#FOIA+disputes 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Office of Government Information Services, What guidelines will OGIS follow 
when conducting alternative dispute resolution (ADR) proceedings?: 
https://ogis.archives.gov/about-ogis/ogis-
procedures.htm#Alternative+dispute+resolution (last visited Apr. 11, 2015) 
(noting that, whether conducted by OGIS or the agency from whom the request 
was made, the mediation will follow procedures established by the 
Administrative Dispute Resolution Act, 5 U.S.C. §§571-84). 
100 See Daniel J. Richardson & Wendy Ginsberg, Cong. Res. Serv., R43924, 
Freedom of Information Act Legislation in the 114th Congress: Issue Summary 
and Side-by- Side Analysis (2015) (describing and comparing S. 337, FOIA 
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Senate Judiciary Committee report in 2015 declared that OGIS had 
been “largely successful in carrying out its mission and serving as a 
bridge between Federal agencies and FOIA requesters,” but 
complained that the Department of Justice frustrated the Office’s 
effort to review agency compliance with FOIA and propose 
appropriate reforms. 101 Since OGIS’s inception, the Committee 
wrote, “DOJ has required OGIS to submit its findings and 
recommendations to several executive agencies for final approval 
before receiving permission to deliver its findings to Congress.”102 
DOJ was interfering with what Congress intended to serve as an 
independent overseer and mediator. The proposed FOIA 
amendment would make plain that OGIS is not required to obtain 
the prior approval or comment of any agency before submitting its 
findings and recommendations to Congress and the President.103 It 
would also require agencies to advise requesters that they can turn 
to OGIS for dispute resolution services rather than rely on 
expensive and time-consuming litigation.104  
OGIS also has admirers in the open government advocacy 
community. The website for the Reporters Committee for 
Freedom of the Press, for example, refers requesters to OGIS, 
noting that the entity can serve as a “good alternative to litigation,” 
and “may be particularly helpful where you believe the agency is 
unreasonably delaying processing your FOIA request, or is not 
timely corresponding with you regarding your request.”105 A policy 
advisor at the Sunlight Foundation noted that, “Overall we’re big 
fans of OGIS. The folks there are committed to making FOIA 
work better.”106 
                                                
Improvement Act of 2015 and H.R. 653, The FOIA Act, both of which would 
expand certain OGIS authorities and place additional mandates on OGIS). 
101 SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, REPORT ON FOIA IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 
2015, S. REP. 114-4, at 3 (2015) [hereinafter SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE 
REPORT]. This frustration is longstanding. See, e.g., Jacob Gerstein, “Patrick 
Leahy, Chuck Grassley on warpath over stalled FOIA recommendations,” 
POLITICO (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-
radar/2012/03/patrick-leahy-chuck-grassley-on-warpath-over-stalled-
117303.html (describing senators’ anger at Department of Justice for holding up 
OGIS’s FOIA reform recommendations). 
102 Senate Judiciary Committee Report, supra note, at 3. 
103 S. 337, 114th CONG. §2(5) (2015), H.R. 653, 114th CONG. §2(c) (2015). 
104 S. 337, 114th CONG. §2(1)(C) (2015), H.R. 653, 114th CONG. §2(d) (2015).  
105 Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Pre-Litigation Option: Office of 
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http://www.rcfp.org/federal-foia-appeals-guide/pre-litigation-option-office-
government-information-services (last visited Apr. 11, 2015). 
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OF FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY (Nov. 11, 2014): 
http://fcw.com/articles/2014/11/11/nisbet-leaves-ogis.aspx (last visited Apr. 
11, 2015) (quoting Matthew Rumsey, policy associate at the Sunlight 
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OGIS has almost no power, however, as open government 
advocates frequently note and complain. One friendly critic from 
the National Security Archive, an NGO that frequently makes 
FOIA requests and complains of widespread agency non-
compliance with the statute, has complained that OGIS’s lack of 
authority to compel agencies to disclose records renders it less 
capable of fixing widespread government secrecy than it ought to 
be.107 In its mediation work, OGIS explicitly notes that it has no 
authority either to enforce FOIA, independently investigate agency 
action, or, ultimately, to compel disclosure. If the parties do not 
agree to resolve the dispute, OGIS closes the case.108 The 
somewhat variable boilerplate language that OGIS uses when its 
director issues Final Response Letters to requesters upon the 
closing of a case reads: 
In cases such as this where an agency is firm in its position, there 
is little for OGIS to do beyond providing more information about 
the agency’s actions. While I understand that this is not the result 
for which you hoped, I hope that this additional information about 
your request is useful to you. Thank you for bringing this matter to 
OGIS; at this time there is no further action for us to take and we 
will consider this matter closed.109 
Although it has the authority to issue advisory opinions—opinions 
that would have no binding authority but might at least influence 
future agency practices and decisions—it has not yet done so.110 If 
OGIS’s mediation services could transform FOIA’s 
administration, we would expect to see FOIA litigation decline; in 
2014, however, frustrated requesters filed more FOIA suits than in 
any year since at least 2001, according to a nonpartisan research 
center.111 Nor has agency compliance with FOIA’s mandates 
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re: OGIS Case No. 201400015, Jan. 27, 2014, available at: 
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improved considerably; according to one recent audit, a majority 
of federal agencies fail to comply with the legal requirement to 
proactively create online document libraries.112 
Two internal audits by external government entities concurred with 
this account of OGIS’s reputation and influence—that it 
affirmatively assists in FOIA’s administration, but that for a variety 
of reasons, its impact has thus far been modest. Congress’ 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), in a 2013 audit, found 
that OGIS had not yet begun to proactively review agencies’ 
policies, procedures, and compliance with FOIA, and that its 
impact through its mediation services has been relatively small and 
could not yet be adequately evaluated because OGIS had not yet 
developed goals and metrics to measure its success.113 In all, GAO 
found, OGIS successfully resolved via facilitation and mediation 
only 30 disputes of the 44 it initiated in the 2012 fiscal year.114 This 
is both a small number of disputes, given the size of the federal 
government and the number of FOIA disputes it engenders, and 
an even smaller number of successes.115 Reviewing OGIS’s first 
two years of operation, the Inspector General of the National 
Archives and Records Administration (the agency of which OGIS 
is a part) concluded in 2012 that the agency has met its general 
statutory mandate to assist with FOIA’s administration, but the 
combination of its limited authority, lack of resources, and some 
issues with information technology inhibited the agency’s 
operation.116 In a 2014 memorandum generally supporting OGIS’s 
project and work, the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, a nonpartisan, independent federal agency established to 
study and improve the administrative process, advised Congress, 
the executive branch, and OGIS to promote and expand mediation 
as an alternative mechanism to resolve FOIA disputes.117 Its review 
of OGIS concluded, in other words, that OGIS had not yet made 
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the impact that an ombudsman surely should have in helping 
impose a fully open, responsive government. 
CONCLUSION 
The ombudsman promises a significant fix for FOIA compliance 
and an open government in the same way that, for American 
administrative law scholars working five decades previously, it 
promised a fix for what was increasingly seen as a sprawling, 
insufficiently accountable bureaucracy. Its adoption to promote 
open government has been incremental and variable. Although its 
successes have been real, they have proven marginal and 
contingent on the political, administrative, and bureaucratic 
context in which the ombudsman was formed and works.118 The 
institution has not put an end either to state secrecy or to 
insufficient compliance with transparency mandates. It seems 
doubtful—indeed, it seems improbable—that it can transform the 
state any more comprehensively than FOIA’s institution of legal 
mandates accomplished, or than new developments in information 
technology and the threat of massive government leaks have 
imposed. My skepticism about the ombudsman as a transparency 
fix is not intended to deny the real, marginal gains ombudsmen 
have made in sub-federal American government, or that the OGIS 
might make in the future. It extends only to claims that an 
institutional fix like the ombudsman can in fact overcome the 
Weberian nature of bureaucratic practice. 
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